The Vietnam War: Triumphs of the Rural Peasantry (Year 1, semester 2)

The Vietnam War, from an American viewpoint, was a costly and tragic mistake. From a Vietnamese perspective, the Resistance War Against America was the final stop in its decades-long journey toward reunification and independence.[1] Today, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam enjoys a relatively liberal economy and, over the years, has seen millions lifted out of poverty.[2] Likewise, U.S.-Vietnam relations were normalized in 1995 and, for former adversaries, are remarkably warm.[3] Considering the current friendliness between Hanoi and Washington, one may ask how the two ended up at war in the first place. To elucidate this, and why the Vietnam War was a mistake, I will develop the argument that Washington misunderstood what generated the South’s insurgency and that its subsequent policy failures deteriorated Saigon’s legitimacy in rural spheres while fanning revolutionary nationalism — cultivating the NLF, which would later trigger the U.S.’ open-ended military commitment.[4] Washington’s misreading of what animated the insurgency led it to wrongly design its aid to Saigon, diminishing the efficiency of its military and economic support as it alienated rural South Vietnamese communities. U.S. leadership believed it could win the South’s support through economic and military assistance to Saigon while the broad Southern population contrarily disapproved of the country’s geographic division, Saigon’s political leadership, and instead preferred political autonomy from the Americans — paradoxically causing GVN military and bureaucratic morale to crumble as U.S. commitment strengthened.[5]

To commence, I will demonstrate how the national identity of Vietnam emerged, and how Vietnamese revolutionary nationalists came to ideologically oppose the Saigon government. Consolidated under the Nguyen dynasty, what is now modern Vietnam was politically and ethnically unified in 1802.[6] It had a distinct national identity and a long history of resistance to outside control.[7] Nevertheless, French colonial influence gradually increased, culminating in the establishment of French Indochina in 1887, which split up the country into three ‘pays’ federally controlled through a French governor-general, reverting centuries of Vietnamese efforts to create national unity.[8] In rural spheres, the French colonialists employed an economic system wherein Vietnamese farmers were largely landless and exploited for their labor, and economic power belonged to imperial interests.[9] Besides a small elite, most rural Vietnamese hence were poor and labor-class, which had produced a widespread hatred of imperialism.[10] [11] Not surprisingly, Vietnamese nationalism already sprouted during France’s colonial rule, but after Japan’s 1940 annexation of French Indochina, truly started flowering.[12] [13] In Vietnam’s 1945 nationalist declaration of independence, Ho Chi Minh not only proclaimed exploitation and domination of Vietnamese peoples were reasons to secede, but also the country’s division into separate regions, which he claimed divided a historically unified country.[14] Splitting up the country at the 17th parallel, as the Geneva accords in 1954 specified, was therefore fundamentally at odds with the nationalist declaration of independence.[15] After the 1954 division, the Northern government consistently maintained that its final goal was political reunification (and did so until its realization), while the Southern Diem regime contrastingly opposed reunification.[16] [17] Diem’s anti-reunification stance, among other factors, in 1960 catalyzed the NLF, an intra-Southern insurgency that relied on Vietnam’s biggest part of the population -rural peasants- for enlistment, and was founded to expedite Vietnam’s political reunification.[18] Strikingly, the NLF’s military campaign almost toppled Saigon in 1965, which directly triggered President Johnson’s open-ended military escalation.[19] [20] In short, Vietnam had formally established its national consciousness before French colonialism, and experienced resurgent nationalism after Japan’s occupation ended French colonial rule in 1940.[21] Besides economic and political oppression by French colonialists, Vietnamese revolutionary nationalists ideologically opposed the geographic separation of Vietnam, while Saigon’s existence was incompatible with reunification. The U.S.-backed Diem regime’s unpopularity aided the growth of revolutionary nationalism in the South, eventually culminating in the NLF’s creation, which would almost topple the Saigon government in 1965.

When Dien Bien Phu in 1954 compelled the French to withdraw from Indochina, the U.S. replaced France’s position in a colonial conflict during a post-colonial era, not only supporting a regime that maintained the widely hated repression and inequality of French rule, but also the existence of an artificial divide that geographically divided a country facing a post-colonial nationalist resurgence.[22] Consequently, while Ho Chi Minh had in 1945 quoted the U.S. Declaration of Independence as part of his Vietnamese declaration of independence, the Americanization of French colonial rule had turned South Vietnamese opinion against U.S. influence in domestic affairs.[23] Exemplary of this are signs De Gaulle in 1964 received from South Vietnam and Vietnamese émigré groups in Paris, which indicated no U.S.-backed government could ever win broad public support, even showing that intra-Vietnamese peace movements were gaining momentum.[24] Accordingly, because its populace widely disliked relying on the U.S., Saigon, for it to win broad domestic support, had to preserve a degree of independence from the Americans.[25] Regardless, maladministration, corruption, repression of its Buddhist population, and domestic threats forced Saigon to depend on U.S. aid.[26] Reliance on U.S. aid, a social coalition that excluded rural peasants, corruption, and other forms of maladministration, ensured South Vietnamese governments consistently endured low support, which allowed for Saigon’s legitimacy to deteriorate as time passed.[27] [28] [29] In conclusion, while the U.S. may have been revered by Vietnamese revolutionary nationalists for its independence struggle, by supporting Saigon they had adopted a colonial position in a post-colonial conflict, which led the South Vietnamese mass to politically reject U.S. influence in domestic affairs. Yet, Saigon’s leadership also depended on U.S. aid for its political survival, which paradoxically undermined its legitimacy.

The Southern government’s ineffectiveness left its marks on South Vietnamese society, causing low morale and deteriorating its military grip on rural areas.[30] [31] It had manifested itself in the psychology of the South Vietnamese bureaucracy, military, and population alike, which, according to a declassified 1964 CIA report, seriously affected morale, creating apathy and pessimism in public officials, even under cabinet-level ministers and high-ranking ARVN officers.[32] The same report also claims high-ranking government officials, including the prime minister, possessed genuine anger and suspicion with the Americans.[33] Likewise, throughout the multiple regimes, and particularly during the Diem regime, revolutionary nationalism’s strength significantly increased — just as the NLF’s military muscle also swelled.[34] [35] [36] Instead of emphasizing communist sentiments, as Washington believed, the NLF claimed a patriotic-nationalist identity.[37] [38] The NLF prevailingly assaulted ARVN sites, employing guerilla tactics from the North in its combat, while specifically enlisting rural peasants in the South for combat, which it often voluntarily achieved.[39] [40] In brief, as Chansu Yi wrote, without the support of the South Vietnamese people, Ho Chi Minh would not have won.[41] Saigon, against the will of its populace, depended on U.S. military and economic aid, which deteriorated its legitimacy. Dependence on the U.S., combined with the Southern government’s broader maladministration, repressiveness, and decimating legitimacy, caused low morale throughout its military and bureaucracy, dwindling their respective capacities. The NLF benefitted from this, greatly increasing its military strength throughout the GVN’s existence.

Washington, on the other hand, misunderstood what spread revolutionary nationalism in the South. It assumed communists gained support due to poverty or coercion, and hence invested in civil aid and infrastructure, such as schools, roads, clinics, and the provision of social services, to counter the NLF’s growth.[42] Nevertheless, access to U.S. aid and critical infrastructure programs remained under the control of local elites, doing little to win the rural peasantry’s support.[43] The NLF, by contrast, employed a vast political program that sought to alleviate the peasantry’s most pressing concern: the unequal rural political economy.[44] By implementing land reform policies based on a Northern-style ideology, the NLF, and by extension the North, broadened its support in rural South Vietnamese communities by diminishing the influence of local elites and expanding the middle peasantry, even positively discriminating in favor of peasants.[45] When Saigon and Washington realized its economic aid programs did not deter the NLF’s growth, it in 1962 instead opted for a strategic hamlet program, which dislocated thousands of Vietnamese peasants and reinforced the power of local landlords.[46] [47] This further played in the NLF’s hands, as their political program focused on class-based wealth inequality. Furthermore, the strategic hamlet program alienated peasants who resented being forcibly removed from their ancestral villages, which further aided NLF recruitment.[48] Additionally, Saigon’s social coalition was narrow and was limited to urban and rural elites, which cultivated a climate favorable to the spread of revolutionary nationalism under rural peasants.[49] The rural peasantry was South Vietnam’s largest population group, corresponding with Opper’s theory of rebel institutional persistence, which states that insurgencies are more likely to persist if they are founded on a broad social coalition.[50] [51] In conclusion, Washington misunderstood the causes of revolutionary nationalism in the South, which diminished the efficiency of its economic aid, and accidentally further alienated Vietnamese farmers. U.S. aid flows partly went toward social and infrastructure programs that did little to address the unequal rural political economy — which was the NLF’s ideological point of exploitation. The Southern government’s social coalition additionally excluded rural peasants, who were the biggest source of NLF recruitment.[52] Hence, Washington’s misperception of what animated the insurgency, and by extension, the depth of the NLF’s support base, diminished the effectiveness of its economic aid programs, aided the growth of the NLF, and even deteriorated relationships with rural Vietnamese communities.

Yet, Washington’s policy mishaps in Vietnam were not limited to economic aid. In reaction to the ARVN’s low morale, President Kennedy in 1961 sent counterinsurgency aid and military advice to Saigon.[53] Yet, the assistance did little to deter the insurgency or boost the ARVN’s morale.[54] Thereafter, Kennedy introduced the strategic hamlet program, which, as mentioned earlier, rather deteriorated Saigon’s legitimacy than improved it. And, after President Johnson assumed command, his Rolling Thunder campaign, which advocates claimed would boost Saigon’s morale, did little to do so, and as civilian deaths mounted, contrarily aided NLF recruitments.[55] [56] Not surprisingly, due to Saigon’s dwindling legitimacy, ARVN troops and officers lacked allegiance to their political leadership, causing its consistently low morale, even as they were buoyed by millions of dollars in U.S. military support.[57] [58] Therefore, one may conclude that Saigon’s crippled legitimacy diminished the ARVN’s morale, minimizing the efficiency of U.S. military aid. In sum, the ARVN was barely committed to its political leadership and suffered from low morale, persisting even after receiving large U.S. military aid flows. Washington’s military support likewise did little to achieve its primary objective -create an ARVN motivated to protect the South’s independence- and instead aided the growth of the NLF as civilian deaths increased.

But how does this illustrate that the Vietnam War was a mistake? Could the U.S. not have simply increased its military aid to the South? Simply put, if U.S. public opinion had been in favor of prolonged military conflict, Saigon might have persisted for a while.[59] But, as mentioned above, the Saigon regime held in place several root causes of the revolutionary nationalist insurgency’s success, prevailingly the geographic division of Vietnam and rural wealth inequality, as it suffered from low legitimacy due to dependence on U.S. aid, a narrow social coalition, and maladministration. Besides, the Vietnamese people had a long history of resisting outsiders, and revolutionary nationalism rapidly resurged after Japan successfully challenged French colonial rule in 1940. Moreover, as the GVN’s grip on power decreased, U.S. support increased, paradoxically deteriorating its legitimacy further. The U.S. also vastly miscalculated the political concerns of the peasantry and aided NLF recruitment through faulty aid and disproportionate civilian casualties. Continuing its military intervention and economic aid programs hence would have been inefficient for the U.S., and without addressing the Southern Vietnamese peasantry’s political-economic concerns, would likely have done little to curb the inevitable. And, constituting that Washington’s economic aid and military support contrarily increased NLF recruitments -which would later trigger the U.S.’ open-ended military intervention- the inevitability thesis, as Logevall wrote, remains appealing.[60] To conclude this essay, the Vietnam War was a mistake because Washington misperceived what produced the revolutionary nationalist insurgency, leading it to wrongly design its policies aimed at countering the insurgency, which even fanned the NLF’s success. Resembling U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, military intervention in Vietnam failed to cultivate lasting political change, ending in failure.[61]

[1] Vi.̂en L.ich Sử Quân S.ư Vi.̂et Nam. Tóm Tắt Các Chiến Dịch Trong Kháng Chiến Chống Mỹ, Cứu Nước, 1954–1975. Hà Nội: NXB Quân đội Nhân Dân, 2003.

[2] Valerie Kozel. Well Begun but Not Yet Done: Progress and Emerging Challenges for Poverty Reduction in Vietnam. Equity and Development. World Bank Group, Washington, DC (2014): 15–16.

[3] Joseph M. Siracusa and Hang Nguyen. “Vietnam-U.S. Relations: An Unparalleled History.” Orbis (Philadelphia) 61, no. 3 (2017): 404–22.

[4] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press, 2020.

[5] Frederik Logevall. “America Isolated.” In A. Daum, L. Gardner, & W. Mausbach (Eds.), America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives (2003): 175–196.

[6] Chansu Yi. “The Collapse of Republic of Vietnam: Colonial Nationalism, Religious Bias, Top-down Anticommunism of Diem’s Regime.” Discourse 201 21, no. 1 (2018): 49–80.

[7] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 7–10.

[8] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 10–11

[9] Natasha Zaretsky et al, Major Problems in American History since 1945: Documents and Essays. Fourth ed. Major Problems in American History Series (2014): 296–297.

[10] Michael Adas. “A Colonial War in a Postcolonial Era.” In America, the Vietnam War, and the World, 27–42. 2003.

[11] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 11.

[12] Michael Adas. “A Colonial War in a Postcolonial Era.” In America, the Vietnam War, and the World, 39. 2003.

[13] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 14.

[14] Natasha Zaretsky et al, Major Problems in American History since 1945: Documents and Essays. Fourth ed. Major Problems in American History Series (2014): 291.

[15] Natasha Zaretsky et al, Major Problems in American History since 1945: Documents and Essays. Fourth ed. Major Problems in American History Series (2014): 294–295.

[16] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester: Columbia University Press (2002): 34–35.

[17] Philippe Devillers. “The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam.” The China Quarterly, no. 9 (1962): 2–23.

[18] David Anderson The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester: Columbia University Press (2002): 13–34.

[19] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 205–34. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 205.

[20] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 48.

[21] Mark P. Bradley. “Setting the Stage.” In The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, 93–119. New York Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2015.

[22] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 111–112.

[23] Natasha Zaretsky et al, Major Problems in American History since 1945: Documents and Essays. Fourth ed. Major Problems in American History Series (2014): 260.

[24] Frederik Logevall. “America Isolated.” In A. Daum, L. Gardner, & W. Mausbach (Eds.), America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives (2003): 180.

[25] Frederik Logevall. “America Isolated.” In A. Daum, L. Gardner, & W. Mausbach (Eds.), America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives (2003): 179.

[26] David Anderson The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester: Columbia University Press (2002): 32–40.

[27] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester: Columbia University Press (2002): 45.

[28] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 34.

[29] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 205–234.

[30] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 44.

[31] “Situation in South Vietnam.” 1954, Digital National Security Archive — DNSA: Document Records, (1954).

[32] “Situation in South Vietnam.” 1954, Digital National Security Archive — DNSA: Document Records, (1954).

[33] “Situation in South Vietnam.” 1954, Digital National Security Archive — DNSA: Document Records, (1954).

[34] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 34

[35] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 221.

[36] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 48.

[37] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 212.

[38] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 50.

[39] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 205–234.

[40] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 80.

[41] Chansu Yi. “The Collapse of Republic of Vietnam: Colonial Nationalism, Religious Bias, Top-down Anticommunism of Diem’s Regime.” Discourse 201 21, no. 1 (2018): 49–80.

[42] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 212.

[43] Marc Opper. “The Vietnam War, 1960–1975.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 225. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 215.

[44] Ibid: 213.

[45] Ibid: 209–225.

[46] Ibid: 213.

[47] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 165.

[48] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 165.

[49] Marc Opper. “A Theory of Rebel Institutional Persistence.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 15–34.

[50] Marc Opper. “A Theory of Rebel Institutional Persistence.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam. ANN ARBOR: University of Michigan Press (2020): 15–34.

[51] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 10.

[52] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 20.

[53] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 39.

[54] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002):39–40.

[55] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 80.

[56] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 46.

[57] David Anderson. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press (2002): 36–39.

[58] Ibid: 97.

[59] Kevin Ruane. War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75. Introductions to History. London: UCL (1998): 87.

[60] Natasha Zaretsky et al, Major Problems in American History since 1945: Documents and Essays. Fourth ed. Major Problems in American History Series (2014): 315.

[61] Carter Malkasian, “The Taliban Are Ready to Exploit America’s Exit,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 2 (March/April 2021).